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When debating the pros and cons of economic regionalism, haven’t we focused enough 
on trade in goods at the expense of services? This article argues that regionalism is 
certainly a building block, not a stumbling block to a multilateral trading system, using 
the services liberalization scheme of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
as a case study. At the same time, it is critical to set out a proper institutional 
arrangement to ensure that regional services liberalization initiatives reinforce the global 
services regime. This paper proposes an amendment of the current GATS Article V to 
define the appropriate relationship between multilateralism and regionalism in the 
context of services. 
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1.   Introduction: Important but Neglected Area in Trade 
Regionalism —Services 
There is general consensus on the growing economic significance of services, 
recognizing that they are as important as goods. In many countries, more than half of 
national wealth is created by service industries. One can easily list the essential services 
of daily life, such as financial or telecommunication services, while services in more 
“minor” sectors such as environment are also flourishing. Services account for a 
considerable share of international trade too. And, interestingly, the process of importing 
and exporting of goods involves services such as transportation and storage; and goods 
cannot be traded without these services. The recent technological development allows 
the international transaction of many services through the internet (Mode 1). Moreover, 
establishing a commercial presence to supply services locally, such as a branch of a 
commercial bank, is within the scope of trade in services (Mode 3). In addition, the 
significance of services provided by foreign lawyers and engineers in the domestic 
territory (Mode 4) and consumption abroad (Mode 2) should not be overlooked, despite 
accurate measurement of these transactions is extremely difficult.  
 
Nevertheless, as far as economic research is concerned, services have not won serious 
attention relative to their economic significance. In other words, empirical analysis of 
trade in services is very limited, unlike trade in goods. This is fundamentally because of 
the lack of comprehensive data on services. It is difficult to accurately measure the 
amount of services traded through the internet across borders and services provided by 
the movement of foreign nationals. A notional difficulty is another reason for the stagnant 
research output. If a foreign bank opens an overseas branch with minor share 
participation, should services provided by the branch to local consumers constitute 
“international” trade in services? Despite these notional and measurement difficulties, 
however, we can still assess the openness of services sectors qualitatively and draw 
some policy implications.  
 
Trade economists usually have trade in goods in mind, when examining trade theories, 
and the studies on trade regionalism are no exception. In particular, a fundamental 
question of trade regionalism theory—whether or not regionalism contributes to the 
multilateral trading system—is usually examined from the goods perspective.
1 
Theoretical debates relating to regional trade agreements or free trade areas (FTAs) 
have been dictated by goods-specialists and they hardly capture the nature of trade in 
services sufficiently. But in reality, the progress of services liberalization at a regional 
level has been remarkable, even compared with multilateral efforts to liberalize services 
trade under the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS), as we will see in 
detail later. If we properly take services into consideration, commonplace views on trade 
regionalism debate will be altered significantly.  
 
This article analyzes regional services liberalization schemes in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the regional service arrangement in 
ASEAN—the ASEAN Framework Agreement in Services Trade (AFAS)—has achieved 
                                                           
1  Kawai and Wignaraja (2008) argue the relations between regionalism and multilateralism from various 
issues covered by Asian FTAs, not limited to trade in goods.  3          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 28 
 
 
significant liberalization, it is seldom mentioned in the academic literature. This is in 
sharp contrast to ASEAN’s trade liberalization scheme in goods—the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA)—which has been examined in detail (for example see Menon 2007). 
Moreover, the majority of studies on AFAS, albeit limited, consider its achievements 
insignificant in a static comparison with GATS (for the details, see Section IV).
 But I 
would argue that ASEAN members “generously” offer GATS commitments comparable 
to their AFAS commitments: a static comparison between GATS and AFAS has a 
fundamental problem in assessing regional efforts at liberalizing services. Instead, a 
dynamic analysis of the evolution of AFAS is needed to understand its real contribution 
to the world trading system.  
 
The remainder of this paper develops a four-fold discussion. Section II conducts an 
overview of the principles and reality of multilateral services negotiations. Section III 
empirically assesses regional services arrangements, using the case of a trade 
regionalist project in ASEAN. Based on these empirical data, Section IV critically 
examines commonplace theoretical arguments on trade regionalism, namely “building or 
stumbling block debates on regionalism” from the perspective of services, and attempts 
to settle the debates that have not been concluded by studies based on goods. Section 
V proposes the best institutional framework for integrating regional efforts at services 
liberalization into the multilateral system. It is critical to properly design the relationship 
between the two so that regional service arrangements will be able to contribute to 
global trade in services.   
 
 
2.   Principles and Reality of Multilateral Service Arrangements 
and Negotiations—GATS 
 
Services were negotiated for the first time in the Uruguay Round, and GATS was finally 
agreed in 1994. The overarching negotiations principles for services liberalization 
applicable to any World Trade Organization (WTO) round negotiations regarding are laid 
out in the GATS preface. 
 
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade 
in services through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting 
the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and at securing an 
overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due respect to national policy 
objectives (GATS preface; underline added). 
 
Eight years after the conclusion of Uruguay, the Doha Round was launched in 2001, the 
first to base the formalities and principles stipulated in GATS. In March 2001, WTO 
members agreed on the “Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in 
Services” of the Doha Round, based on Article XIX of GATS. Paragraph 5 of the 
Guidelines says:  
 
There shall be no a priori exclusion of any service sector or mode of supply. Special 
attention shall be given to sectors and modes of supply of export interest to 
developing countries (the Guidelines; underline added). The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism  |       4 
 
 
But the Doha Round faced difficulty in accelerating negotiations in various fields, partly 
due to its expanded membership and services negotiations were no exception. Many 
services specialists—including the Chair of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Trade in Services at the WTO—thought that the then on-going bilateral request-offer 
approach had led to no-positive indication of submitting commercially meaningful 
commitments (Committee on Trade in Services, 2005). Trade ministers believed it was 
necessary for negotiators to identify priority service sectors to facilitate negotiations. The 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, adopted in December 2005, said:  
 
In addition to bilateral negotiations, we agree that the request-offer negotiations 
should also be pursued on a plurilateral basis… Any Member or group of Members 
may present requests or collective requests to other Members in any specific sector 
or mode of supply, identifying their objectives for the negotiations in that sector or 
mode of supply (Annex C Paragraph 7). 
 
It was expected that limited negotiating resources would be spent in sectors critical for 
concluding the Doha Round. But in reality, more than twenty plurilateral negotiations 
groups, covering almost all sectors and sub-sectors, were established after the Hong 
Kong ministerial meeting.
2   The sectors included: legal; architecture/engineering; 
computer related services; postal/courier; telecommunications; audio-visual; 
construction; distribution; education; environmental; financial; maritime; air; logistics; 
energy; cross-border services; mode 3; mode 4; MFN exemptions; services related to 
agriculture; and tourism. The concentration of resources on priority services to achieve a 
fruitful outcome was unsuccessful and it turned out that no sector is prioritized when all 
sectors are prioritized. 
 
The Doha Round was suspended twice (July 2006 and July 2008), and there is no clear 
prospect of concluding the negotiations in the near future. As a result, no improved 
overall services commitments have been approved since the Uruguay Round, and 
progressive liberalization of services has faced a serious problem at the WTO-level. The 
ambitious attempt to balance no a priori exclusion and commercially meaningful 
sector/mode-specific plurilateral group negotiations also seem to have failed. In a 
nutshell, the grand ideas of services negotiations as laid out in GATS and the Guidelines 
have not been implemented so far.    
 
 
3.   The Achievements of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services (AFAS) 
 
AFAS, ASEAN’s own services liberalization project within the region, began in December 
1995 at the meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) in Bangkok, Thailand. 
Leaders recognized the growing importance of trade in services at a regional level and 
established AFAS, in adherence to GATS principles, to wit: 
 
 
                                                           
2  For the development of services negotiations, see Katsuri, 2007. 5          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 28 
 
 
Reiterating their commitments to the rules and principles of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services [GATS] … and noting that Article V of GATS permits the 
liberalising of trade in services between or among the parties to an economic 
integration agreement [.] 
 
In fact, AFAS members make commitments in line with a GATS-style positive-list 
approach, unlike the negative-list approach of the North American Free Trade Area 




This section empirically examines AFAS achievements relevant to the principles of GATS 
as discussed in the previous section. It first analyzes the evolution of AFAS round 
negotiations in terms of “progressive liberalization” and “no a priori exclusion”, and then 
assesses the AFAS priority sector liberalization scheme in comparison with the GATS 
negotiations (under which all sectors are selected as priority sectors).  
 
3.1   The Evolution of AFAS Round Negotiations 
 
Six rounds of regional services packages have been concluded under AFAS so far.  The 
analysis below focuses on whether or not at least one sub-sector under one sector is 
covered. Although it may be true that the question of whether or not whole sub-sectors 
under one sector are covered is critical from a business perspective, the distinction 
between the perfect exclusion of one whole sector and the situation where "at least one 
sub-sector is committed" is important from a political perspective. As previously 
discussed, the a priori exclusion of one whole sector is not allowed in the Doha Round 
negotiation.  
 
The 1997 package (the first): Soon after the Bangkok meeting, the first AFAS round of 
negotiations was launched, and the first overall package was agreed in December 1997 
(Table 1). All nine ASEAN members, including the two newest members—Myanmar and 
the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)—submitted services schedules, a 








                                                           
3  W/120 classification on which GATS commitments are based has twelve sectors. However, the twelfth 
sector, namely "others" will not be analyzed in this paper. Eleven sectors are listed in Table 3.  The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism  |       6 
 
 
Table 1: GATS and AFAS Packages 
 GATS  AFAS 
1994  Uruguay Round Commitments   
1995 ...  AFAS  Protocol 
1996 ...  ... 
1997 ...  1st  Package 
1998 ...  2nd  Package 
1999 ...  ... 
2000 ...  ... 
2001  Doha Round Negotiation started  3rd Package 
2002 ...  2nd  Finance 
2003  Doha Round Initial Offer submitted  Amendment of AFAS Protocol 
2004  Cambodia Accession  4th Package; Priority Sector Agreement 
2005  Doha Round Revised Offer submitted  3rd Finance and 4th Air Transport 
2006 Vietnam  Accession  5th  Package 
2007 ...  6th  Package 
2008  Doha Round Suspended  ... 
 
Note: ... no data available. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Table 2: AFAS and WTO Membership of Newer ASEAN Members 
 Vietnam  Lao  PDR  Myanmar  Cambodia 
ASEAN/AFAS 
Membership  1997 1997 1997  1999 
WTO/GATS 
membership  2006 Under  negotiation  Original member 
of GATT 1947  2004 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
While the 1997 AFAS package was not very ambitious, basically covering only tourism 
and transport (Table 3), the former included in the schedules of all nine AFAS members. 
Five out of nine members covered transport. The Philippines also covered business 
services (audit) and Viet Nam covered some telecommunications services.  It is quite 
remarkable for the ASEAN members to start liberalization in services in the same year 
when the Asian financial crisis struck.  
 7          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 28 
 
 























































































































Brunei   2nd  2nd  2nd        2nd 4th 1st 5th 1st 
Cambodia 2nd  3rd  3rd  5th  5th 5th 2nd 5th 2nd 5th 2nd 
Indonesia 2nd  2nd  2nd  5th  5th  6th     1st  5th  1st 
Lao PDR  2nd  2nd  2nd     6th  2nd  1st  2nd 
Malaysia  2nd 3rd 2nd 5th 5th 6th 2nd 5th 1st 5th 1st 
Myanmar  2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd    5th 2nd 5th 1st 5th 2nd 
Philippines 1st  2nd  2nd  5th  5th  2nd  5th  1st  2nd 
Singapore  2nd 2nd 2nd 5th 5th 5th 2nd 4th 1st   1st 
Thailand 2nd  2nd  2nd  5th  5th  5th 2nd 5th 1st 5th 1st 
Viet Nam  2nd  1st  2nd  6th  6th 6th 2nd 5th 1st 6th 2nd 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Shaded portions: no commitment so far. 
 
The 1998 Package (the second): There is a marked improvement in the commitments 
in new and existing sectors. Four new sectors—business, communications, construction, 
and financial services—appeared in most countries’ commitments for the first time. All 
AFAS members made commitments in business services and, except for two relatively 
new ASEAN members (Myanmar and Viet Nam
4), all countries expanded commitments 
in the communications (telecommunication) sector. Nearly all improved commitments in 
construction and finance (excepting Indonesia in finance), a marvelous achievement in 
1998 given that finance and telecommunication were the most difficult sectors in GATS 
negotiations.   
 
The scope of commitments in tourism and transport, meanwhile, was significantly 
broadened. All countries, except Brunei Darussalam,
5   enhanced the coverage of 
commitments in the transport sector, and most countries advance their commitments in 
tourism. Interestingly, even countries that had already made transport commitments in 
1997 did so again in 1998. This showed that ASEAN members were attempting to 
balance “marginal” efforts among members in each round of AFAS negotiations.   
                                                           
4  Viet Nam’s 1997 Package had already made goods commitments in telecommunication. 
5  Brunei’s 1997 Package had already made good commitments in transportation ranging from air to 
maritime.  The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism  |       8 
 
 
Cambodia—supposedly to join ASEAN in 1997 but postponed due to internal political 
struggle—immediately submitted its AFAS commitment after accession to ASEAN in 
1999. The coverage of its 1999 commitments was limited to four sectors (business, 
finance, tourism, and transport), but the country gave its best effort, given its level of 
economic development and the prevailing international environment (for example, 
Cambodia was not even a WTO member at that time).  
 
The 2001 Package (the third): The third package covered almost the same sectors as 
in 1998; but two important features of this package should be highlighted. First, 
members significantly deepened commitments in five sectors (business, communication, 
construction, tourism, and transport). ASEAN paid significant attention to the balance in 
terms of “marginal” efforts. In fact, all members, including those who had already made 
commitments in 1998, improved in all five sectors. Cambodia’s communications and 
construction sectors and Myanmar’s communications sector were first covered in the 
2001 package. 
 
Second, members made no commitment in sectors other than the above five.
6 This 
implies that ASEAN was practical: it carefully avoided liberalization in sectors where 
political sensitivity lay. Another practical reason for the limited coverage of the 2001 
package may have been the launching of the WTO Doha Round.  It is understandable if 
countries have strong hesitation in improving their regional commitments when 
international negotiations were about to start (the Doha Ministerial meeting was held in 
November 2001 in Doha).  
 
The 2004 Package (the fourth): The Bali Concord II was adopted at the ASEAN 
Summit in Bali in October 2003, agreeing in two major points: (i) the free flow of services 
should be achieved by 2020 (as to the priority sectors liberalization timeline, see below); 
and (ii) the application of the “ASEAN minus X” formula in the implementation of member 
countries’ services commitments was enabled. Under this formula, a subset of ASEAN 
members (more than two) that are ready to liberalize a certain services sector on a 
reciprocal basis may do so without extending concessions to non-participating countries. 
 
Nevertheless, no new sectors were covered in 2004, with improvements limited to the 
four that were already covered by the 2001 package. It is difficult to provide a definitive 
answer, but maybe the principal reason for this stagnant outcome would be the then-
ongoing Doha Round negotiations. It was also not specified in the protocol how to 
implement the ASEAN minus X formula, and members did not actually use the formula in 
making commitments in the 2004 Package.
7  
 
The 2006 Package (the fifth): By 2006, AFAS commitments grew significantly more 
complicated. To understand the whole picture of a member’s commitment, one should 
                                                           
6  Excepting Malaysia’s distribution sector; Malaysia’s 2001 schedule included wholesale and retail 
services. 
7  Moreover, this rule has not been used until now because realizing “ASEAN minus X” entails 
operational difficulty, although its philosophy is attractive. Accordingly, all commitments so far by all 
members were on a non-discriminatory basis in terms of the ASEAN minus X approach. The ASEAN 
minus X method, however, can be said to be politically important, because liberalization among a 
“coalition of the willing” was supported at the minister level.   9          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 28 
 
 
refer to the first, second, third, and fourth packages, because only changes in 
commitments from the previous package were inscribed in their respective overall 
packages. In addition to past overall packages, one should also refer to independent 
financial packages and air transport packages. Because the decision on liberalization of 
some service sectors was highly technical, ministers in charge of specific fields started 
the negotiations on respective sectors by themselves, rather than through economic 
ministers. The liberalization of services in the field of finance and air transport falls under 
this category.
8  In 2002, finance ministers agreed a services package exclusively for 
financial services.
9 Likewise in 2005, the first independent air transport package was 
concluded.
10  As a consequence of the above developments, it resulted in too many 
documents regarding each country’s commitments,
11 and monitoring the commitments 
became very tedious.  
 
The fifth package overcame these problems to a certain degree by consolidating past 
four schedules. By simply looking at the 2006 package, it is quite understandable the 
status of commitments in 2006, except for sectors covered by specialized ministers’ 
meetings, such as finance and air transport. The only drawback of this methodological 
change was that it became difficult to identify the improvement from previous 
commitments—one should carefully compare old and new commitments to find 
improvements (and possibly drawbacks as well). The consolidation of past commitments 
under the fifth package is an excellent example of ASEAN’s full support to the GATS 
approach even at a very technical level. 
 
The 2006 package made a significant improvement in actual commitments as well. All 
“difficult” sectors that had not been covered in previous packages were included in the 
2006 package (distribution, education, environment, and recreation services). For 
example, liberalization in the distribution sector is politically sensitive in many ASEAN 
countries because family-run stores would face difficulty from competition with foreign 
shopping centers. The environment (for example, sewerage) and education are also 
very difficult to liberalize because they are closely linked to government regulations and 
governmental services. But by 2006, AFAS achieved comprehensive sector coverage.  
 
At the same time, the 2006 package remains in keeping with ASEAN’s “flexibility” 
principle (though not the ASEAN minus X principle). Half of members did not make 
commitments in environmental services in 2006, though they eventually did in the later 
years (discussed in the next section). Flexibility was also extended by other ASEAN 
members to Viet Nam which allowed Viet Nam not to make commitments in some 
sectors (distribution, education, and environment) because it was about to complete its 
accession negotiations with the incumbent WTO members. Had Viet Nam's 2006 AFAS 
commitments been “too” good, it would have undermined its bargaining position with 
                                                           
8  Services incidental to manufacturing, fisheries, agriculture, forestry and mining.  
9  This agreement is called “second”, because the 1998 overall package covered some financial services, 
and is regarded as the “first” financial package. 
10  This is usually called the “fourth” air transportation package because, as with financial services, the 
overall package in 1997, 1998, and 2001 included air transportation. 
11  In particular, the relations between the minus X approach and the MFN Exemption List are unclear.  
From the GATS perspective, discriminatory treatment among members is prohibited unless the 
member had registered sectors where such a treatment would be introduced beforehand. The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism  |       10 
 
 
regard to WTO accession.  
 
The 2007 Package (the sixth): Viet Nam joined the WTO in December 2006, and its 
AFAS commitments made significant improvement in 2007. Other ASEAN members also 
improved, not just free-riding on Viet Nam’s new commitments. While Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Lao PDR reserved making commitments in environment services in their 
2006 schedules, these countries covered some environment sub-sectors in 2007.   
 
The 2007 Package can be said to be “GATS” plus. But because the GATS offers 
submitted by ASEAN countries in 2006 are basically confidential, it is difficult to compare 
ASEAN’s 2007 AFAS commitments with their GATS commitments thoroughly. Malaysia 
is the only ASEAN country that made its latest GATS offer submitted in 2006 public.
12 As 
far as Malaysia is concerned, AFAS 2007 (and 2006) commitments included sectors that 
are not covered by its latest GATS offer. For example, distribution services, educational 
services (other than higher education) and health services (other than private hospital) 
are included in Malaysia’s AFAS 2006, while they are not covered in its GATS 2006 offer. 
Similarly, Malaysia decided to make AFAS commitments in environment sectors in 2007, 
which it has not offered under GATS.  
 
As a result, the 2007 coverage was significantly more comprehensive. Aside from some 
limited exceptions, all countries made some commitments in all sectors. As Table 3 
shows, the country-sector matrix of making commitments under the AFAS scheme was 
almost completed by 2007, meaning that the future agenda of AFAS would be upgrading 
or improving existing commitments in sectors.  
 
In summary, AFAS countries tend to upgrade their commitments every one or two years. 
No other FTA in the world has liberalized the services sector so quickly: AFAS achieved 
significant liberalization of the services sectors through consecutive rounds of 
negotiation with almost all sectors covered by 2007. It is also possible to argue that 
AFAS has better achieved what GATS attempted to do, namely, “progressive 
liberalization through round negotiations” and “no a priori exclusion”. 
 
Furthermore, ASEAN’s plans for further liberalizing services is ambitious. During the 
ASEAN Summit in December 2005, the members agreed to accelerate services 
liberalization in non-priority sectors by 2015, “with flexibility” (for priority sectors, see 
below). The target year was moved ahead five years from the Bali Concord II agreed in 
2003. The “ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint” adopted at the ASEAN Summit in 
November 2007 clearly indicate to “remove substantially all restrictions on trade in 
services for all services sectors [other than priority sectors] by 2015”, with some detailed 
parameters of the services liberalization process.  
 
 
                                                           
12  Alongside developed countries that are proponents of services liberalization, Malaysia agreed to make 
its GATS offer available on the website of Coalition of Service Industries. See: http://www.uscsi.org/ 
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3.2   Priority Services Sector Liberalization under AFAS: Logistics Sector 
 
In November 2004 in Vientiane, Lao PDR, the ASEAN Framework Agreement for the 
Integration of Priority Sectors was agreed to advance efforts at liberalizing priority 
sectors (otherwise known as the Vientiane Action Plan or VAP). The adoption of the 
scheme of liberalizing priority sectors per se can be said to be GATS plus, in contrast to 
GATS negotiations, where all sectors are regarded as priority. The VAP listed eleven 
priority sectors
13 of which four of them service sectors (air transport, tourism, E-ASEAN 
and healthcare). In the case of air transport for example, the Appendix 1—Roadmap for 
Integration of the Air Travel Sector —provides a detailed liberalization schedule. It is 
indicated in the VAP Appendix 1 that air freight services should be fully liberalized by 
December 2008 and scheduled passenger services by December 2010 (with no 
limitations on the first to fifth freedoms of commercial aviation rights). 
 
With regard to the schedule of liberalization in priority sectors, the deadline for the 
liberalization of priority sectors was set at 2010 under the Bali Concord II. The 
Amendment Agreement on Priority Sectors that elaborated the procedures for 
designating priority sectors liberalization was adopted in December 2006. It was agreed 
there that the elimination of all limitations in Mode 1 and 2 should be achieved by the 
end of 2008. Mode 3 foreign equity participation should be allowed by the end of 2010.  
 
By August 2007 in Cebu, Philippines, the ASEAN Sectoral Integration Protocol for the 
Logistics Services Sector was agreed. The logistics sector was added as the fifth priority 
service sector. Because of time constraints, ASEAN countries agreed to set a timeline of 
logistics liberalization separate from other priority sectors, setting the target date at 2013, 
alongside with the four other priority sectors by 2010.   
 
Logistics services are unique in the context of services negotiations. There is no logistics 
services category in the W/120 classification, which is used by both GATS and AFAS 
commitments. This is because logistics services are a cluster of cross-cutting services 
ranging from transport to communications (for example courier services), which are 
already included in the W/120. Because of their cross-cutting nature, logistics services 
are commercially important. If the liberalization of one minor service sector along the 
logistics services chain is missing, the whole logistics chain may not function well. In 
other words, merely liberalizing some transport sectors without considering actual flow of 
goods will result to mismatched business needs. This is the exact reason why the 
“logistics” plurilateral negotiation group was established in the Doha Round in line with 




The GATS logistics plurilateral group classifies logistics services into four categories: (i) 
core freight logistics services; (ii) freight transport services; (iii) other-related logistics  
                                                           
13  They are: (i) agro-based products; (ii) air travel; (iii) automotives; (iv) e-ASEAN; (v) electronics; (vi) 
fisheries; (vii) healthcare; (viii) rubber-based products; (ix) textiles and apparel; (x) tourism; and (xi) 
wood-based products.  
14  Among over twenty plurilateral negotiation groups, energy does not constitute a “sector” in W/120 
alongside logistics.  The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism  |       12 
 
 
Table 4: GATS Logistics Negotiation and AFAS Logistics Protocol 
 
   GATS  AFAS 
Cargo handling   Yes (741)  Yes (741) 
Storage and warehousing  Yes (742)  Yes (742) 





Other auxiliary service  Yes (749)  Yes (749) 
Maritime/internal waterways 
transport 
Yes (7212, 7213,  
7214, 7222, 7223) 
Yes (7212, 7213) 
Air  Yes (732, 734)  Covered by air 
priority scheme 





Road  Yes (7123,  
7124, 83102) 
Yes (7123) 
Business services  Yes (8672, 8673, 
8676) 
No 






Distribution  Yes (621, 622, 631, 
632) 
No 
Computer and related services  Yes (84)  No 





Management consultation  Yes (865, 866)  No 
Services 
Customs clearance services  No  Yes (no CPC) 
Custom/transportation facilitation etc  Covered by Trade 
Facilitation  
Yes 
Assistance to logistics services providers etc  No  Yes 
Human resource etc  No  Yes 
Infrastructures etc  No  Yes 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
services; and (iv) non-core freight logistics services. It puts special emphasis on the 
liberalization of core-logistics services: cargo handling (CPC 741); storage and 
warehousing (CPC 742); transport agency (CPC 748); and other auxiliary services (CPC 
749). The AFAS logistics liberalization scheme covers all core-logistics services included 
in the GATS plurilateral requests. The deadline for completing full commitments in those 
services is 2013.
15   Except for a few sub-sectors, most sub-sectors under freight 
transport services in the GATS logistics plurilateral request are included in the AFAS, 
with the deadline of either 2008 or 2013. Some sub-sectors in other-related logistics 
services and non-core freight logistics services in the GATS requests are also covered 
by AFAS, with the notable exceptions of business services (for example, engineering 
services: CPC 8672) and computer and related services.
16 Moreover, ASEAN’s logistics 
services liberalization scheme goes far beyond GATS as it includes customs clearance 
services, which are outside the scope of GATS due to their close link with governmental 
                                                           
15  The timeline of the logistics service liberalization is not under the constraint of the Amendment 
Agreement.  
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Table 5: WTO Negotiations on Air and Logistics and ASEAN’s Positions 
 
  Requesting members  Requested members 
Air   Australia; Chile; EC; New Zealand; 
Norway; Switzerland 
Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; People’s Republic 
of China (PRC); Egypt; Fiji; Hong Kong, China; India; 
Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Pakistan; 
Philippines; Singapore; South Africa; Thailand; 
Taipei,China; United Arab Emirates; United States (US) 
Logistics  Australia; Chile; Hong Kong, 
China; Japan; New Zealand; 
Switzerland; Taipei,China 
Argentine; Brazil; Brunei; Canada; PRC; Columbia; 
Egypt; EC; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Korea; Kuwait; 
Liechtenstein; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; 
Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; 
Philippines; Singapore; Qatar; South Africa; Sri Lanka; 
Thailand; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; US; Uruguay 
 
Note: ASEAN countries are shaded. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
The ASEAN Logistics Protocol covers various measures that actually facilitate trade. Its 
Appendix lists 44 issues and the scope of the AFAS logistics scheme is significantly 
more comprehensive, even in comparison with the GATS logistics negotiations. While 
GATS logistics negotiations cover only logistics services, the liberalization of logistics 
services is an important, but not exclusive component of the AFAS logistics scheme. In 
addition to the liberalization of services relating to logistics (including customs clearance 
services), ASEAN’s Logistics Protocol includes four major components:  
•  Customs/transportation facilitation, with its main component the adoption of 
international standards established by organizations such as the WTO and the 
World Custom Organization (WCO);  
•  Assistance to logistics service providers in ASEAN, including the support of 
small- and medium-sized logistics enterprises and the establishment of networks 
among logistics service providers in the region;  
•  Human resource development for customs officials and the private sector; and 
•  Infrastructure and investment, with the development of the ASEAN transport 
logistics corridor its principal focus.  
What is interesting is that ASEAN members are not strong proponents of liberalization of 
air and logistics services at the GATS (Table 5). Rather, all ASEAN countries are 
involved in air and/or logistics plurilateral negotiation as requested parties: they are 
required to open their markets by developed WTO members. Thus, it can be said that 
ASEAN’s strategy is first to liberalize the sectors within the region to enhance 
                                                           
17  Article I (3-c) stipulates: "services" includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the 
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competitiveness, and then finally open to global competition. Given that Doha 
negotiations may take at least a few more years to conclude, ASEAN’s liberalization 
scheme of priority sectors seems to be is far advance than GATS.  
 
 
4.  Implications for the “Building Block versus Stumbling 
Block”Debate  
 
This section examines the fundamental debate regarding trade regionalism from the 
standpoint of liberalizing trade in services. The main question is: is the FTA a stumbling 
block or a building block in the multilateral trading system? The principal concern of the 
debate is human and capital resource allocation, and thus economic welfare. The variant 
of this question, however, is related to a more institutional problem: whether or not 
regional initiatives lead to erosion of the multilateral trading system.  
 
FTA opponents say FTAs will lead to trade diversion, and reduce world-wide economic 
welfare. Moreover, they emphasize the opportunity costs of scarce negotiating resources 
for regional negotiations, which otherwise could be used for multilateral negotiations. 
FTA proponents argue that the trade creation effect is larger than the trade diversion 
effect, resulting in more efficient resource allocation in a region. According to them, 
policy reforms are locked-in not only by multilateral arrangements but also by regional 
arrangements. Increasing the bargaining power of a group in international economic 
relations is another justification for trade regionalism (ADB, 2008). It is, however, 
empirical evidence, not a theoretical plausibility, that settles this debate.  
 
As far as services are concerned, trade diversion effects are not critically large. This is 
mainly because service commitments merely bind an existing liberal regime, without 
creating new market access. In addition to this, due to the fact that services usually 
require a high-level of customization, regional trade in services is unlikely to lock out 
trade emanating from outside a region. In the case of goods, consumers seldom care 
about the language, beliefs and culture of producers whose labors or services are 
embodied in products. In contrast, the language, beliefs and culture of a service supplier 
are critical for consumers. Suppose ASEAN member’s made commitments in higher 
education services, for example: a Thai university or polytechnic could then open an 
educational center in Cambodia someday. But is it relevant to argue that such a trade in 
services reduces the business opportunity of Cambridge University?  This means that 
trade creation effect is larger than trade diversion effect in the case of services, because 
increase in regional service trade is not at the expense of third parties.  
 
A theoretically plausible concern that regional efforts to liberalize services would reduce 
the enthusiasm for multilateral trade liberalization may not be applicable for trade in 
services. Some argue critically that regional services arrangements in Asia do not have 
“GATS plus” commitments by comparing GATS offers and AFAS commitments for 
example, when new GATS offers are submitted (Rajan 2002; Roy et al. 2007). Rather, 
this is the result of ASEAN members' “generous” GATS commitments which are 
comparable to their AFAS commitments. ASEAN members are the best students of 
GATS because they have made a significant effort to “multilateralize” the regional 15          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 28 
 
 
initiative of services liberalization. In fact, as we have seen, Malaysia’s AFAS 2006 and 
2007 commitments are much more liberal than its GATS 2006 offer. AFAS leads to better 
GATS offers of ASEAN members.  
 
Furthermore, ASEAN’s effort to improve AFAS commitments even during the Doha 
Round should not be overlooked. It is misleading to overemphasize the relatively minor 
outcome of the third overall package in 2001, the year Doha was started. It is very likely 
that countries' making “too good” offer at regional-level commitments might undermine 
their bargaining power at the WTO.
18  One should note that AFAS concluded three 
services packages during the Doha Round (2004, 2006 and 2007), and the ASEAN 
members’ services commitments have been deepened significantly. This means that 
ASEAN has steadily liberalized services sectors in the region regardless of the progress 
(or no progress) in multilateral GATS negotiations. Accordingly, it is irrelevant to develop 
a theoretical argument that AFAS could block multilateral efforts. One important caveat 
relating to the relationship between AFAS and GATS is that AFAS has not been notified 
to WTO under GATS Article V. While the question whether the original AFAS in 1997 was 
consistent to GATS system may be controversial,
19 the AFAS 2007, which has a broad 
sectoral coverage should be significantly consistent with GATS – and ASEAN's effort to 
notify AFAS to WTO should be encouraged so that its efforts regarding services 
liberalization will be widely recognized as WTO compliant.    
 
The effect of regional services arrangements is to internationally bind domestic policy 
and legislative reforms regarding trade in services. The lock-in effect of regionalism does 
not seem to be negligible: this is particularly true in AFAS because it is a multilateral 
regional arrangement, not a bilateral  regional arrangement.
20  This effect is especially 
critical for ASEAN members that have/had not obtained WTO membership yet. Viet Nam 
and Lao PDR have submitted AFAS schedules since 1997 and Cambodia since 1999, 
immediately after obtaining ASEAN membership. Being familiar with how to make 
services commitments under the AFAS scheme before joining WTO makes their WTO 
accession negotiations much easier, such as Viet Nam’s case (ADB 2008). The 
experience of making AFAS commitments that inevitably entails domestic policy and 
legislation reform, will definitely smoothen Lao PDR’s (among Asia’s least developed 
countries) WTO entry.  
 
AFAS has even contributed negotiating resources to the multilateral trading system. 
Certainly, developing countries like Viet Nam face human resource constraints, such as 
skilled services negotiators. But as far as AFAS is concerned, regional negotiations have 
contributed to the improvement of developing countries’ negotiation skills, because the 
modalities of AFAS negotiations are almost the same as GATS negotiations.  
 
                                                           
18  The opposite relation also happens. Some countries do not seem to want to offer too much in Doha so 
as not to undermine their bargaining power in regional/bilateral agreements. In short, nuanced balance 
between the level of multilateral and regional commitments should be maintained.  
19  In particular, it is uncertain whether AFAS 1997 satisfied GATS V-1a, because its coverage was limited 
to the tourism sector. For GATS V-1a, see the next section.  
20  Arrangement among too many parties may have a problem associated with monitoring costs. 
Meanwhile, arrangements consisting of only two parties may be ignored relatively easily by a 
contracting party compared with agreements among more than two parties. See Ravenhill (2001, 29).  The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism  |       16 
 
 
Moreover, AFAS has helped increase the bargaining power of ASEAN as a group and 
individual ASEAN members at GATS negotiations. ASEAN members do not always 
speak with one voice at services negotiations at WTO, but it is still regarded as a kind of 
group in WTO.
21 ASEAN members did not ask Viet Nam to make further improvement of 
its AFAS commitments on the occasion of the 2006 AFAS package, which could have 
reduced the country’s bargaining power with regard to WTO accession, and strongly 
supported its WTO membership, as aforementioned. Moreover, ASEAN countries 
attempt to strengthen less competitive services sectors by opening them up within the 
region first, before opening to global players at the global level. In fact, ASEAN countries 
have participated in GATS negotiation groups on air and logistics as “requested” 
members, but they have chosen these sectors as priority sectors for liberalization under 
the AFAS scheme. This is expected to eventually lead to a change in ASEAN’s 
negotiation positions at the WTO; sooner or later, ASEAN may be able to engage in a 
GATS negotiation group on logistics and air sectors
22  not  as  “requested” but as 
“requesting” members. The competitiveness of regional single services market in 
ASEAN may increase in long-term negotiating power of the region.  
 
 
5.   Policy Proposal: The Amendment of the GATS Article V  
 
Above all, it is important to recognize the fundamental difference between trade 
liberalization in goods and services. In the case of goods, the complete elimination of 
tariffs after a transitional period is implicitly assumed when countries form an FTA. In 
other words, the event of trade liberalization in goods is one-off. In the case of services, 
however, progressive liberalization through successive rounds of negotiations is the 
common practice, though the modality of future services negotiations is still 
unpredictable.  
 
Because the one-off elimination of tariffs will entail large economic impact on outside 
parties, some requirements for forming an FTA are stipulated in GATT XXIV. Satisfying 
these conditions is essential to maximizing the trade creation effect and minimizing the 
trade diversion effect. They are:  
 
•  Duties and other restrictive regulations with respect to substantially all the trade 
among FTA members should be eliminated (GATT XXIV-8);  
•  Any interim agreement regarding an FTA should be terminated within a 
reasonable length of time (GATT XXIV-5c); and 
•  Duties and other regulations applicable to WTO members other than FTA 
members should not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than those prior 
to the formation of the FTA (GATT XXIV-5a).  
 
                                                           
21  ASEAN’s joint proposal on Emergency Safeguard Mechanism (ESM) in Services is one of examples. 
22  The coverage of air transport services under GATS is very limited because of its Annex on Air 
Transport Services, which stipulates that GATS is not applicable to any measures affecting traffic rights.    17          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 28 
 
 
Similar, but not the same conditions need to be satisfied by regional services 
arrangements are listed in GATS V. They are:  
•  Service arrangements should have substantial sectoral coverage (GATS V-1a); 
and  
•  Substantially all discrimination regarding National Treatment in the sector 




Interestingly, the footnote of the GATS attempts to provide more detailed explanation of 
the “substantial sectoral coverage”. It should be understood as substantial coverage in 
terms of the number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply, and no 
permission of a priori exclusion of any mode of supply. Despite such an elaboration, it is 
still uncertain what it means exactly. An important point here is that GATS does not 
simply say “substantially all the trade in services”, unlike the case of goods. The way in 
which “substantial sectoral coverage” is examined is not simple. This is mainly because 
the concept of services trade and services per se is elusive and measuring the amount 
of trade in services is extremely difficult.  
 
Another interesting point is that the “time-frame” of integration is not a strict requirement 
in the case of services. It only says “on the basis of a reasonable time-frame”, not “within 
a reasonable time-frame” like the case of goods. As long as a reasonable plan is 
presented, such a service integration scheme satisfies this condition. This is exactly the 
reason why progressive liberalization is possible for regional services arrangements. As 
a result of these, it is extremely difficult for GATS to prevent the formation of regional 
service arrangements just on the basis of their inconsistency to GATS V. This in turn 
means that service arrangements have not been effectively governed by GATS.  
 
What then is the appropriate and practical mechanism for GATS to govern regional 
services arrangements? The key is the fundamental nature of services liberalization—
progressive liberalization. As we have seen, both GATS and AFAS attempt to achieve 
progressive liberalization, but the latter has been more successful. In the case of goods, 
the principal concern is to minimize the negative effect of a “one-off” elimination of tariffs 
in the region by setting requirements for regionalism. But because of the fundamental 
nature of services liberalization (namely, autonomous and progressive liberalization), the 
direct control of regional services arrangements by setting requirements is not practically 
feasible; without discretion in terms of liberalization measures, a regional services 
arrangement does not become fruitful for members. To a certain extent, reflecting 
regional-level “progressive liberalization” in multilateral progressive liberalization, with 
some time-lag, is a better way to cope with regionalism.  
 
The essence of the proposal can be explained by Chart 1. The basic idea is: a particular 
level of liberalization achieved in regional commitments is expected to be multilateralized 
at GATS after a reasonable period. If the frequency of WTO round negotiations is as 
significant as regional round negotiations, the two can be described as two parallel lines 
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in the chart. In this case, what has been achieved at a regional level should be “copied” 
into multilateral commitments after a reasonable period. However, the frequency of 
multilateral negotiations seems to be much lower than regional negotiations. As we have 
seen, while there have been six packages of AFAS services commitments, no round has 
been concluded at the multilateral level after the Uruguay Round. Therefore, in reality, 
the level of liberalization of services commitment at WTO can be described as a stair-
shape line in the chart. GATS commitments of services should, after a designated period, 
at least cover what has been achieved at a regional level.  
 
Accordingly, GATS Article V ter is proposed as a new paragraph in the current GATS.   
 
GATS V ter   Regional Integration and GATS  
Specific commitments regarding regional integration shall be, to the extent possible, 
reflected in specific commitments of GATS after a reasonable time-framework.  
 
If this is achieved, there will be no need for WTO services negotiators to engage in ad-
hoc bargaining in each round of WTO negotiations in order to request other WTO 
members to realize GATS commitments which are comparable to their regional 
commitments.  
 
The relationship between regionalism and multilateralism is not just a theoretical 
academic debate. On the one hand, as long as services agreement is concerned, 
regionalism is likely to function as a building block of the multilateral trading system. On 
the other, it is also important to legally ensure that regional service liberalization 
contributes to a freer multilateral services regime. Policy-makers need to design the 
relationship between the two to ensure that regionalism reinforces multilateralism in the 
field of services as well.  
 
                      Chart 1: Regional and Multilateral Commitments 
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